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The issue of which ﬁrms export is an important one and has been the topic of many recent
papers in the international trade literature. The evidence indicates that even in so-called
export sectors, many ﬁrms do not export their products. Research has concentrated on two
factors to explain the exporting behavior of ﬁrms: productivity di erences among ﬁrms and
the presence of ﬁxed costs to entering foreign markets. It has been widely documented that
persistent productivity di erences exist among ﬁrms operating in the same industry and
that the more productive and larger ﬁrms tend to be the ones that export (see Bernard and
Jensen (1999), Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998)). The
presence of ﬁxed costs to entering foreign markets has been shown in Bernard and Jensen
(2004a) and Roberts and Tybout (1997). Furthermore, Pavcnik (2002), Treﬂer (2004) and
Bernard and Jensen (2004b) have documented that trade liberalization leads to aggregate
productivity gains.
In a seminal paper, Melitz (2003) developed the ﬁrst trade model that is consistent with
this empirical evidence. In this model, ﬁrms do R&D to develop new product varieties and
then learn how costly it is to produce these new products. Once ﬁrms have learned what
their marginal costs of production are, they decide whether or not to incur the one-time ﬁxed
costs of entering the local and foreign markets. The ﬁxed cost of entering the foreign market
is assumed to be higher and consequently, only the most productive (lowest marginal cost)
ﬁrms choose to export their products. When trade liberalization occurs (the variable costs
to trade fall), ﬁrms earn higher discounted proﬁts from exporting and more ﬁrms choose to
become exporters. This leads to more competition for all ﬁrms in their domestic markets
and raises the productivity level required for domestic production. Thus, trade liberalization
facilitates the entry of more productive new ﬁrms and given the exogenous death rate of old
ﬁrms, leads to aggregate productivity gains.
In this paper, we present a model of international trade that yields Melitz-type results
without the standard Melitz-type assumptions. Instead of assuming that ﬁrms do R&D to
develop new product varieties, we study a “quality ladders” endogenous growth model where
ﬁrms do R&D to develop higher quality products. And instead of assuming that ﬁrms learn
1their marginal cost after developing a new product, we assume that there is no uncertainty
about the marginal cost of a ﬁrm that innovates. Firm heterogeneity emerges naturally in
our model because of uncertainty in R&D itself: some ﬁrms innovate more quickly than
other ﬁrms. Thus, at any point in time, di erent ﬁrms produce di erent quality products
and have di erent proﬁt levels. We show that this quality ladders growth model generates
the same empirically supported results about trade liberalization and productivity as Melitz
(2003) if it takes time for ﬁrms to learn how to export.
The model also has some important properties that di erentiate it from Melitz (2003).
First, the model has an endogenously determined ﬁrm exit rate that is a ected by trade
liberalization. This endogeneity comes naturally, since the model has a quality ladders
structure. Firms do R&D to develop higher quality products, and when they succeed, they
drive the previous quality leaders out of business. Innovation is associated with a process
of creative destruction, as was originally emphasized by Schumpeter (1942). We show that
trade liberalization (lowering the variable costs to trade) leads to an increase in the exit rate
of ﬁrms. This result is consistent with the evidence in Pavcnik (2002), where it is reported
that a period of trade liberalization in Chile (1979-1986) was accompanied by a “massive”
exit rate of ﬁrms. Gibson and Harris (1996) have similar ﬁndings for New Zealand and Gu,
Sawchuk and Rennison (2003) show a signiﬁcant increase in the exit rate of ﬁrms as a result
of tari  cuts in Canada during 1989-1996. In Melitz (2003), an exogenous ﬁrm exit rate is
assumed for ﬁrms that have already entered a market (since there is no other reason why
ﬁrms would choose to go out of business) and consequently trade liberalization has no e ect
on the exit rate of ﬁrms that have already entered a market.
Second, the model implies that exporters charge higher prices on average for their prod-
ucts. There is evidence to support this result: Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) have found that
exporters charge higher prices using Columbian data and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) obtain
the same result using Indian and US data. Theoretical models dealing with this empirical
regularity either introduce a second source of ﬁrm heterogeneity beside productivity (Hal-
lak and Sivadasan 2009) or correlate a ﬁrm’s marginal cost with product quality (Baldwin
and Harrigan 2007, Kugler and Verhoogen 2008). Neither approach is chosen in this paper.
Exported products are cheaper in Melitz (2003), which is clearly at odds with the empirical
2evidence.
Third, the model implies that exporters charge higher markups on average. Recently
evidence has emerged to support this result: looking at Slovenian ﬁrm-level data for the
period between 1994 and 2000, De Loecker and Warzynski (2011) ﬁnd that exporters charge
signiﬁcantly higher markups on average compared to non-exporting ﬁrms. While several
models have now been developed to explain why exporting ﬁrms charge higher markups,
our model is distinctive in that we can explain this empirical regularity while assuming CES
consumer preferences (unlike in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)), linear pricing (unlike in Sugita
(2011)) and iceberg trade costs (unlike in Irarrazabal et. al. (2012)). In our model, there is
less product market competition associated with new products and ﬁrms that export tend to
sell new products, so these ﬁrms are able to charge higher markups (and higher prices) than
non-exporting ﬁrms. All ﬁrms charge the same markup in Melitz (2003), which is clearly at
odds with the empirical evidence.
Fourth, since some ﬁrms learn to become exporters faster than others, the model implies
that at any point in time, there are some relatively large and productive ﬁrms that do not
export their products. Bernard et. al. (2003) and Hallak and Sivadasan (2009) have docu-
mented that many large and productive ﬁrms do not export. The model does not generate
a threshold productivity level like in Melitz (2003), where all the ﬁrms with productivity
above the threshold export and all the ﬁrms with productivity below the threshold do not
export. The Melitz model can explain why many ﬁrms do not export but it cannot explain
why many large ﬁrms do not export.
Turning to the related literature, Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) present a growth
model that is similar to the model in this paper (growth is semi-endogenous) but with Melitz-
type assumptions. Their model can be characterized as a “Melitz model with economic
growth” since the model has a strictly positive steady-state rate of economic growth and
the original Melitz model has a stationary steady-state equilibrium (aggregate variables do
not change over time). Gustafsson and Segerstrom solve their model analytically and derive
a result that is both surprising and disturbing: when the steady-state rate of economic
growth is su ciently high, then trade liberalization retards economic growth and makes
all consumers in both countries worse o  in the long run (Theorem 3). In this paper, we
3go a step further. We solve this “Melitz model with economic growth” numerically and
show that the surprising result occurs for plausible parameter values. When all parameter
values are carefully chosen to satisfy various stylized facts [including a 2 percent steady-state
rate of economic growth, consistent with the evidence in Jones (2005)], we ﬁnd that trade
liberalization retards economic growth and makes all consumers in both countries worse o  in
the long run. We also do the same numerical exercise for the model introduced in this paper
and ﬁnd that, for parameter values that satisfy the same stylized facts, trade liberalization
substantially promotes economic growth and makes consumers better o  in the long run.
In the empirical literature on the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth,
early papers such as Sachs and Warner (1995) found that economic growth was substantially
higher for open countries than for closed countries.1 These ﬁndings however were called
into question in Rodriquez and Rodrik (2000), a paper that has lead many economists to be
skeptical that open trade policies are signiﬁcantly associated with economic growth. More
recently, Wacziarg and Welch (2008) ﬁnd that “trade-centered reform” has, on average,
robust positive e ects on economic growth rates within countries. For the typical country
that switches from being closed to being open, they ﬁnd that the growth rate of real per
capita GDP increases from 1.1 percent to 2.5 percent. We are not aware of any empirical
work suggesting that trade liberalization (of any form) leads to lower economic growth. Thus,
we ﬁnd the above-mentioned results to be profoundly disturbing. It is shocking that when
all countries lower their trade costs for importing goods and the volume of trade increases,
all consumers are made worse o . But this is what we ﬁnd happens in a closely comparable
growth model with Melitz-type assumptions (Gustafsson and Segerstrom, 2010).
In another related paper, Segerstrom and Sugita (2012) study more carefully the prop-
erties of the original Melitz model. They present a brand new way of solving the Melitz
model using simple and intuitive diagrams, and show that these new techniques can be used
to solve a multi-industry version of the Melitz model (the original model had just one in-
dustry). Segerstrom and Sugita then study the e ects of unilateral and non-uniform trade
liberalization (what happens when a country opens up to trade in some industries but not
in others) using the multi-industry version of the Melitz model and ﬁnd that industrial pro-
1For a survey of the literature on trade and growth, see Segerstrom (2011).
4ductivity increases more strongly in non-liberalized industries than in liberalized industries
(Theorem 2). This is the exact opposite of what researchers ﬁnd empirically. For example,
looking at the impact of the Canada-USA free trade agreement on Canadian manufacturing
industries, Treﬂer (2004) ﬁnds that industrial productivity increased more strongly in lib-
eralized industries than in non-liberalized industries. Thus empirical evidence that is cited
in support of the Melitz model in survey papers by leading scholars (Bernard, Jensen, Red-
ding and Schott, 2007; Helpman, 2011; Redding, 2011; Melitz and Treﬂer, 2012) is actually
evidence against the Melitz model.2 Segerstrom and Sugita (2012) provide further motiva-
tion for exploring alternatives to the Melitz model, models of international trade without
Melitz-type assumptions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our model of inter-
national trade without Melitz-type assumptions. We show that this model has a steady-state
equilibrium and derive ﬁve equilibrium properties (Propositions 1 through 5). In Section 3,
we solve the model numerically for plausible parameter values to obtain the e ects of trade
liberalization on economic growth and welfare. To help the reader fully appreciate the sig-
niﬁcance of our ﬁndings, we also numerically solve a closely comparable growth model with
Melitz-type assumptions for the e ects of the same trade liberalization. In Section 4, we
o er some concluding comments and in the Appendix, we present calculations done to solve
our model in more detail.
2 The Model
2.1 Overview
The model presented in this paper is essentially a two country version of the Segerstrom
(2007) quality ladders endogenous growth model with the new assumption that it takes time
for ﬁrms to learn how to export.
2Here is another way of thinking about the issues. Suppose that the government of a country is interested
in raising the productivity of a target industry using trade policy. What should the government do? Should
the government liberalize the target industry by lower the tari  rate on imports or protect the target industry
by raising the tari  rate on imports? The theoretically correct answer based on the Melitz model is that
the government should protect the target industry. The higher is the tari  rate on imports, the higher is
productivity in the target industry [see Corollary 1 in Segerstrom and Sugita (2012)].
5There are two symmetric countries, Home and Foreign. In both countries, there is a
constant rate of population growth n and the only factor labor is inelastically supplied.
Consumers have constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. Workers are employed
in a production sector and in an R&D sector. There is a continuum of di erentiated products
indexed by     [0,1]. Each product   has di erent possible quality levels denoted by j.
Higher values of j denote higher quality and j is restricted to taking on integer values.
Firms are involved in R&D races to discover the next higher quality product and when a
ﬁrm succeeds, it replaces the previous incumbent who was selling product   as a monopolist.
When the state-of-the-art quality product is j, the next quality level to be discovered is
j + 1. Over time each product is pushed up its ‘quality ladder.’ While holding the patent
for the state-of-the-art quality of product  , a ﬁrm starts to sell only in its local market.
To become an exporter it must invest in learning how to enter the foreign market. Each
ﬁrm operates until a higher quality version of its product   is discovered by another ﬁrm
from its home market. Non-exporters do not have an incentive to improve on their own
products. Exporters do not have an incentive under certain parameter conditions that we
assume hold. As a result, only followers do innovative R&D. We solve the model for a
symmetric steady-state equilibrium.
2.2 Consumers and Workers
The economy has a ﬁxed number of households. They provide labor, for which they earn
wages and save by holding assets of ﬁrms that engage in R&D. Each household grows at
the rate n>0, hence the supply of labor in the economy at time t can be represented
by Lt = L0ent. Each household is modelled as a dynastic family that maximizes present
discounted utility U  
   
0 e (  n)t ln[ut]dt, where the consumer subjective discount rate  
satisﬁes  >n . The static utility of a representative consumer deﬁned over all products
available within a country at time t is
ut  












6This is a quality-augmented Dixit-Stiglitz consumption index, where d(j, ,t) denotes the
quantity consumed of a product variety   of quality j at time t,  > 1 is the size of each
quality improvement and the product di erentiation parameter     (0,1) determines the
elasticity of substitution between di erent products     1
1   > 1. Since  j is increasing in
j, (1) captures in a simple way the idea that consumers prefer higher quality products.
Utility maximization follows three steps. The ﬁrst step is to solve the within-variety
static optimization problem. Let p(j, ,t) be the price of variety   with quality j at time t.
Households allocate their budget within each variety by buying the product with the lowest
quality-adjusted price p(j, ,t)/ j. To break ties, we assume that when quality-adjusted
prices are the same for two products of di erent quality, each consumer only buys the higher
quality product. We will from now on write p( ,t) and j( ,t) to denote the price and quality
level of the product within variety   with the lowest quality-adjusted price. Demand for all
other qualities is zero.
The second step is to ﬁnd the demand for each product   given individual consumer
expenditure ct that maximizes individual utility ut at time t. Solving this problem yields
the demand function
d( ,t)=





where d( ,t) is demand for the product within variety   with the lowest quality-adjusted
price, q( ,t)    j( ,t) is an alternative measure of product quality,        1 > 1 and
Pt  
   1
0
q( ,t)p( ,t)
1  d 
  1
1  
is a quality-adjusted price index.
The third step is to solve for the path of consumer expenditure ct over time that max-
imizes discounted utility subject to the relevant intertemporal budget constraint. Solving
this intertemporal problem gives the standard Euler equation ˙ ct/ct = rt    , implying the
individual consumer expenditure grows over time only if the interest rate rt exceeds the
subjective discount rate  . A higher interest rate induces consumers to save more now and
spend more later, resulting in increasing consumer expenditure over time. Since ˙ ct/ct must
be constant over time in any steady-state (or balanced growth) equilibrium, the interest rate
7must be constant over time and from now on, we will refer to the interest rate as r.
A natural measure of productivity at time t is real output ctLt/Pt divided by the number
of workers Lt, or ct/Pt. But ct/Pt equals ut as Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) have shown. Thus
measuring productivity in this model is equivalent to measuring the static utility level of the
representative consumer.
2.3 Product Markets
We solve the model for a symmetric steady-state equilibrium where half of all products  
originate from Home and the other half from Foreign. Every product   will have a version
of it sold in both markets. Home originating products will either be exported to Foreign
or produced there by Foreign’s competitive fringe. We assume that once a better version
j of a product originating from Home is discovered, the blueprint of its previous version
j   1 becomes common knowledge in both Home and Foreign, and can be produced by the
competitive fringe in Foreign. Production by the competitive fringe in Foreign continues
until the new incumbent in Home learns how to export, starts to sell that product of quality
j in Foreign and drives the competitive fringe there with its j   1 version out of business.
Thus some of the Home originating products having a more advanced version sold in Home
and with corresponding assumptions for the Foreign country, some of the Foreign originating
products will have a one step higher quality version sold in Foreign.
The production of output is characterized by constant returns to scale. It takes one
unit of labor to produce one unit of a good regardless of product quality. The wage rate is
normalized to one and ﬁrms are price-setters. Each ﬁrm produces and sells a unique product
 . Proﬁts of a producer depend on what it sells domestically and what it sells abroad if it
exports. We assume iceberg trade costs: an exporter needs to ship  > 1 units of a good
in order for one unit to arrive at the foreign destination. Let  L( ,t) and  E( ,t) denote
proﬁts from local sales and from exporting, respectively, for a ﬁrm based at Home. Let
d( ,t)Lt denote demand for product   in the Home country. Knowing that lower quality
products can be produced by the competitive fringe, the proﬁt-maximizing price that quality
leaders can charge at home and abroad is the limit price   if  < 1/ , where 1/  is the
monopoly price. If     1/ , then innovations are drastic and ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to charge
8the monopoly price 1/  at home and (for      / ) the monopoly price  /  abroad. Quality
leaders disregard the competitive fringe when the innovation step   is large enough.
We will assume that innovations are not drastic ( < 1/ ), which translates into quality
leader ﬁrms charging the limit price pL = pE =   both at home and abroad. This price does
not depend on the quality level of a particular product relative to that of other products.
Proﬁts are the di erence between price and marginal cost times demand d( ,t)Lt for product
  at Home, that is,  L( ,t) = (  1)d( ,t)Lt. Let Qt  
  1
0 q( ,t)d  be the average quality
of all products sold in Home and y(t)   Qt   ct/P
1  
t be per capita demand for a product
of average quality sold by a leader in Home. Substituting for demand, we can rewrite proﬁts
from selling locally as




Proﬁts depend on the quality q( ,t) of the product sold. This dependence on the quality
of the product comes from the demand function, which is essential for the existence of ﬁrm
heterogeneity. Di erent product quality levels result in di erent proﬁts. In comparison to
Melitz (2003) and Haruyama and Zhao (2008) where heterogeneity of proﬁts comes from
di ering marginal costs, we obtain heterogeneity from the revenue side of proﬁts. If we
had assumed a Cobb-Douglas utility function (  = 1) which results in unit-elastic demand,
we would not have that heterogeneity because proﬁts would not depend on product quality
(remember that        1 in the deﬁnition q( ,t)    j( ,t)).
The marginal cost for selling abroad is  > 1. Assuming that the limit price ﬁrms can
charge is higher than the iceberg trade cost (  >  ), we can express proﬁts from exporting
as




The proﬁt ﬂow from exporting  E is an increasing function of the per-unit proﬁt margin
     , the relative quality of the ﬁrm’s product q( ,t)/Qt and the market size measure
y(t)Lt.
Since it becomes common knowledge how to produce a good after a higher quality version
is discovered, any ﬁrm can produce and sell it. It follows that competitive fringe ﬁrms price
at marginal cost and earn zero proﬁts. Therefore all products are either sold by leaders at
9price   or sold by the competitive fringe at price 1.
2.4 R&D Races and the R&D Cost to Becoming an Exporter.
There is two R&D activities described by two distinct R&D technologies: inventing higher
quality levels of existing products and learning how to export. Labor is the only input used
in both R&D activities. There are quality leaders, ﬁrms that hold the patent for the most
advanced product within a certain product variety and followers, ﬁrm that try to improve
upon the products that are sold by leaders. We solve for an equilibrium where Home ﬁrms
do not improve on products originating from Foreign and Foreign ﬁrms do not improve on
products originating from Home.
Leaders that produce for the local market do not try to improve on their own products.
Given the same R&D technology as that of followers, they have a smaller incentive to innovate
in comparison to followers. A non-exporting leader has strictly less to gain  L(j +1)  L(j)
from improving on its own product (omitting   and t for brevity) compared to a follower who
would gain  L(j + 1), hence leaders can not successfully compete for R&D ﬁnancing with
followers. If a leader is an exporter, the gain will be  L(j + 1) +  E(j + 1)    L(j)    E(j).
That gain is lower than that of a follower  L(j + 1) if  < 2. Given      
 
1  , for exporting
leaders not to have an incentive to improve on their own products, we must have  < 2
1  
  .
Limit pricing requires  < 1/  and for ﬁrms to be able to export requires   <  . Hence






. This guarantees that
exporting leaders do not try to improve their own products.
Followers are the ones that invest in quality improving R&D and once they discover a
state-of-the-art quality product, they take over the local market from the previous leader. Let
Ii denote the Poisson arrival rate of improved products attributed to follower i’s investment





 j( ,t) ,
where li is the labor devoted to R&D by the follower,  < 1 is an R&D spillover parameter,
and AF > 0 is an R&D productivity parameter. The R&D spillover parameter   can be
10positive or negative but the restriction  < 1 is necessary to ensure that the model has a
ﬁnite equilibrium rate of economic growth. The term  j( ,t) in the R&D technology captures
the idea that as product quality increases over time and products become more complex,
further innovation becomes increasingly di cult. Venturini (2010) ﬁnds that the R&D-driven
growth models with the best empirical support assume increasing R&D di culty.
The returns to innovative R&D are independently distributed across ﬁrms, across product
varieties and over time. Summing over all ﬁrms, the Poisson arrival rate of improved products









where l  
 
i li is the total labor devoted to innovative R&D. We solve the model for
an equilibrium where the product innovation rate I does not vary across product varieties
    [0,1].
The second R&D activity is that of leaders learning how to become exporters. This
activity can be seen as learning to comply with foreign market regulations, establishing a
distribution network, and more generally, paying for the information needed to adapt to a
less familiar environment. The investment each ﬁrm needs to make in R&D labor to enter the
foreign market is a type of ﬁxed cost of market entry, a common feature in the heterogenous
ﬁrm literature. The ﬁxed cost here is stochastic and ﬁrms with more sophisticated products
need to invest more in order to achieve the same arrival rate of the knowledge on how to
enter the foreign market. Leaders invest lE units of labor in an R&D technology which makes









where AE is an R&D productivity parameter,     (0,1) measures the degree of decreasing
returns to leader R&D expenditure, and   is the same R&D spillover parameter. The term
 j( ,t) appears again in the learning-to-export technology and captures the idea that it is
more di cult to learn how to export a more advanced product.
11There are four types of ﬁrms that sell products within the Home country. First, there
are Home leaders who export their products. The measure of product varieties produced
by these ﬁrms is mLE. Second, there are Home leaders who do not export their products.
The measure of product varieties produced by these ﬁrms is mLN. Third, there are Foreign
exporters. The measure of product varieties produced by these ﬁrms is mFE. Fourth, there
are competitive fringe ﬁrms. If a better version of a product is developed abroad and the new
Foreign leader has not yet learned how to export this product, then the next lower quality
version of that product is produced at Home by competitive fringe ﬁrms. The measure
of product varieties produced by these ﬁrms is mCF. Since all product varieties from both
countries are available to the consumers in each country and there is a measure one of product
varieties that consumers buy, it follows that mLN + mLE + mFE + mCF = 1 holds. Due to
symmetry, the measure of product varieties produced by Home exporters equals the measure
of product varieties produced by Foreign exporters, that is, mLE = mFE. Furthermore,
half of all product varieties are produced by Home leaders at Home and half of all product
varieties are produced by Foreign leaders at Foreign, so mLN + mLE = 1
2 also holds.
Figure 1 below describes what happens with a product sold initially by a non-exporting
ﬁrm. The state-of-the-art quality is produced by the non-exporting ﬁrm and the competitive
fringe produces the next lower quality version of the same product abroad. Leaders do not
improve on their own products, only followers do. A non-exported product is improved on
by some follower at the innovation rate I (lower left arrow). Also, the current non-exporting
leader learns how to become an exporter at a rate IE (lower middle arrow). When the product
begins to be exported, the exporting leader takes over the foreign market. Products sold by
exporters are state-of-the-art quality in both countries. The competitive fringe knows how
to produce a one step lower quality version, but the exporting leader prices in such a way
that it drives the competitive fringe out of business. The exporting leader sells its product
both at home and abroad until its product is improved on by a follower at home, which
happens at the rate I (upper middle arrow). The new leader takes over the home market
and sells the better version there, whereas the older version is sold abroad at marginal cost.












Figure 1: Product Dynamics.
2.5 Bellman Equations and Value Functions
Firms maximize their expected discounted proﬁts. Followers solve a stochastic optimal
control problem with a state variable j( ,t), which is a Poisson jump process of magnitude
one. Non-exporting leaders maximize over the intensity of R&D dedicated to learning how to
export, where the knowledge arrives at a certain Poisson rate after which the ﬁrm becomes an
exporter. The only decision exporters make is over what prices to charge in both markets.
Other than that, they exploit the market power they have until a better version of their
product   is discovered by a follower.
Free entry into innovative R&D races and constant returns to scale in the R&D technology
together imply that followers have zero market value. Let vF(j) = 0 be the value of a
follower when the current state-of-the-art quality is j. All followers have the same zero
value regardless of whether they are targeting exporters and non-exporters. Let vLN(j) be
the value of a leader that does not export (omitting   and t from the value function for
notational simplicity) and let vLE(j) be the value of a leader that does export.
The Bellman equation for follower ﬁrm i is rvF(j) = maxli  li+IivLN(j+1). The follower
invests li in R&D and becomes a non-exporting leader with an instantaneous probability
Ii. Substituting for Ii from the R&D technology equation and solving gives the following







The value of the ﬁrm increases in the quality of the product for which it holds a patent.
The Bellman equation for a non-exporting leader is given by
rvLN(j) = max
lE
 L(j)   lE   IvLN(j)+IE (vLE(j)   vLN(j)) + ˙ vLN(j). (4)
This equation states that the maximized expected return on the non-exporting leader’s stock
must equal the return on an equal-sized investment in a riskless bond rvLN(j). The return
is equal to a stream of proﬁts  L(j) minus investment in R&D to enter the foreign market
lE, plus the arrival rates and respective changes in value attributed to being overtaken by
a follower  IvLN(j) and becoming an exporter IE (vLE(j)   vLN(j)), plus the capital gain
term ˙ vLN(j) because the value of the ﬁrm can change over time. Non-exporting leaders make
a decision over lE, how much to invest in R&D to learn how to export.
The Bellman equation for an exporting leader is simpler in the sense that exporting ﬁrms
do not invest in R&D. They only exploit their quality advantage over other ﬁrms and the
knowledge how to export. They face the risk of being replaced by a ﬁrm that learns how
to produce a higher quality version of the same product and thus, the Bellman equation for
an exporting leader is rvLE(j)= L(j)+ E(j)   IvLE(j) + ˙ vLE. The value of an exporting















where     (1  )/  > 0. The value of an exporter increases in the quality of the product it
produces and is also positively related to the rate at which ﬁrms become exporters IE.
2.6 Finding the Labor and R&D Equations
To solve the model, it turns out that a key variable is relative R&D di culty x(t)   Q
1  
t /Lt.
Lt is the size of the market and Q
1  
t is an increasing function of the average quality of all
14available products. As this average quality increases over time, innovation becomes relatively
more di cult. On the other hand, as the size of the market increases, there are more resources
that can be devoted to innovation. We will show that solving the model reduces to solving
a simple system of two linear equations in two unknowns, where the two unknowns are
relative R&D di culty x(t) and the consumer demand measure y(t)   Qt   ct/P
1  
t . The
two equations are the labor equation that describes when there is full employment of labor
and the R&D equation that is derived from the proﬁt-maximizing decisions of ﬁrms.
To ﬁnd the labor equation, we need to ﬁrst introduce some terms connected with product
quality. Given that Qt  
  1
0 q( ,t)d  is the average quality of all products sold in Home, let
QLE  
 
mLE q( ,t)d  be a quality index of products produced by Home leaders that export,
QLN  
 
mLN q( ,t)d  be a quality index of products produced by Home leaders that do not
export, QFE  
 
mFEq( ,t)d  be a quality index of products produced by Foreign exporters,
and QCF  
 
mCF q( ,t)d  be a quality index of products produced by the Home competitive
fringe. These quality indexes are all functions of time but this is omitted to simplify notation.
They obviously satisfy
Qt = QLE + QLN + QFE + QCF. (6)
Also let qLE   QLE/Qt, qLN   QLN/Qt, qFE   QFE/Qt and qCF   QCF/Qt. Each of
these terms represents the quality share of a particular group of ﬁrms in the total quality
index Qt, where the share is determined not only by the average quality within the group
but also by the measure of ﬁrms constituting the group. The quality shares satisfy 1 =
qLE + qLN + qFE + qCF and must be constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium.
Given the symmetry condition QLE = QFE, it follows that
1 = 2qLE + qLN + qCF. (7)
All labor in the Home country is fully employed in equilibrium and is divided between
employment in the production sector LP(t) and employment in the R&D sector LR(t).
Starting with LP(t), demand by Home consumers for a product sold by a Home leader is
d( ,t)Lt =





Qt y(t)Lt. Demand for an exported product sold abroad is also
d( ,t)Lt, but  d( ,t)Lt needs to be shipped, and hence  
q( ,t)
Q(t) y(t)Lt is produced. Demand
15for a product produced by the competitive fringe is d( ,t)Lt =





Qt y(t)  Lt,
where we multiply by    to take into consideration that the competitive fringe prices at




d( ,t)Ltd  +  
 
mLE




Substituting and simplifying gives
LP(t) = (qLE + qLN +  qLE +  
 qCF)y(t)Lt.
To solve for employment in the R&D sector, we use the R&D technologies for quality in-
novation and learning how to export. Rearranging terms yields l = I j( ,t)
Q
 






E  j( ,t)
Q
 




E /AE. For half of all product varieties (mLE+mLN =1 /2),
Home follower ﬁrms do innovative R&D and for varieties with a Home non-exporting leader,









and after substituting for l and lE, we obtain
LR(t)=
 





Full employment of labor implies that Lt = LP(t)+LR(t). Dividing both sides by Lt, we
obtain the labor equation:
1 = (qLE + qLN +  qLE +  
 qCF)y +
 





In order for equation (8) to hold in steady state equilibrium, it must be the case that x(t)
and y(t) are both constant over time, and therefore we will write them as x and y. Once
we have solved for the equilibrium values of I, IE, qLE, qLN and qCF, the labor equation
can be graphed as a downward sloping line in (x, y) space (as illustrated in Figure 2). The
interpretation of the slope is that when R&D is relatively more di cult (higher x), more
16resources must be devoted to R&D activities to maintain the steady-state innovation rate
and less resources can be devoted to producing goods, so consumer demand y must be lower.
To ﬁnd the R&D equation, we substitute into (4) for lE using (3), for vLN(j) and for
vLE(j)   vLN(j) using (5). This results in the R&D equation
r + I +  
˙ Qt
Qt








E  . (9)
Once we have solved for the steady-state equilibrium values of I, ˙ Qt/Qt and IE, the R&D
equation can be graphed as an upward sloping line in (x, y) space (as illustrated in Figure
2). The interpretation of the slope is that when R&D is relatively more di cult (higher x),
consumer demand y must be higher to justify the higher R&D expenditures by ﬁrms.
2.7 Quality Dynamics
To determine the steady-state equilibrium innovation rate I, we must ﬁrst study the dynam-
ics of the di erent quality indexes.
Since x is constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium, it follows from the deﬁnition
x   Q
1  
t /Lt that ˙ x/x = (1    ) ˙ Qt/Qt   n = 0 and ˙ Qt/Qt = n/(1    ). Also since qLE,
qLN and qCF are all constant over time in any steady-state equilibrium, it follows that














1    
. (10)
In any steady-state equilibrium, the quality indexes of all types of ﬁrms must grow at the
same rate.
The dynamics of QLE  
 










where the ﬁrst integral captures that non-exported products become exported products at
the rate IE, and the second integral captures that exported products become non-exported
17products when innovation occurs, which happens at the rate I. Using the deﬁnitions of the
quality indexes and dividing by QLE, we obtain the growth rate of QLE:
˙ QLE/QLE =( qLN/qLE)IE   I.






j( ,t)+1    
j( ,t) 









where the ﬁrst integral captures that non-exported products are improved on at the rate
I, the second integral captures that non-exporters become exporters at the rate IE and the
third integral captures that exported products are improved upon at the rate I, after which
these products become non-exported. This time dividing by QLN, we obtain
˙ QLN/QLN =(     1)I   IE +  (qLE/qLN)I.
The quality dynamics for the competitive fringe at Home is dependent entirely on the
dynamics of ﬁrms in Foreign. The inﬂow of product varieties into the Home competitive
fringe is from all Foreign exporters whose products are improved upon at the rate I by
Foreign followers. The outﬂow is from the group of Foreign non-exporters who learn to
become exporters at the rate IE and take back the market of a product previously produced











Using the deﬁnitions of the quality indexes and dividing by QCF, we obtain
˙ QCF/QCF =( qLE/qCF)I   IE.
Given (10), we can solve the two equations ˙ QLE/QLE =( qLN/qLE)IE   I = n/(1    )
and ˙ QLN/QLN =(     1)I   IE +  (qLE/qLN)I = n/(1    ) for I and then combine them to
eliminate the I term. This yields a quadratic equation in qLN/qLE that has only one positive
18solution. Plugging this positive solution back into (qLN/qLE)IE   I = n/(1    ), we obtain
the unique steady-state equilibrium innovation rate:
I =
n
(    1)(1    )
.
The innovation rate I depends in the long run on the population growth rate n>0, the
R&D di culty growth parameter  > 1 and the intertemporal R&D spillover parameter
 < 1. Individual researchers become less productive with time ( > 1) and what keeps
the innovation rate steady in the long run is the growing number of people employed in the
R&D sector, which is made possible by positive population growth (n>0).
Having solved for the steady-state innovation rate I, straightforward calculations lead to















I(    1) + IE
All three variety shares are uniquely determined once we have solved for the steady-state
rate at which ﬁrms learn how to export IE.
2.8 Finding IE





0 q( ,t)p( ,t)1  d  = QLE 1   + QLN 1   + QFE 1   + QCF = (2qLE 1   +
qLN 1   + qCF)Qt. It follows that P
1  
t must grow at the same rate n/(1    ) as Qt in any
steady-state equilibrium. We have already established that y   Qt   ct/P
1  
t is constant
over time, so it immediately follows that consumer expenditure ct must be constant over
time. Thus, the consumer optimization condition ˙ ct/ct = r     implies that r =   holds.
Using the Bellman equation for an exporting leader, substituting for  L(j) and  E(j),
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r + I +   ˙ Qt/Qt
 . (11)
Taking into account that r =  , I = n
(  1)(1  ), and ˙ Qt/Qt = n
1  , the RHS of (11) is
a monotonically increasing function of IE. Thus equation (11) uniquely determines the
steady-state equilibrium value of IE. Furthermore, since the RHS decreases when   falls
holding IE ﬁxed, IE must increase to restore equality in (11). We have established one of
the central results in this paper:
Proposition 1 Trade liberalization induces a higher level of investment in learning how to
export (    =  IE  ).
This result is quite intuitive. When the barriers to trade are decreased, it becomes more
proﬁtable to be an exporter. Therefore ﬁrms invest more in learning how to export.
2.9 The Steady State Equilibrium
Given that we have solved for the steady-state equilibrium values of I, IE, qLN, qLE and qCF,
the labor equation (8) can be graphed as a downward sloping line in (x, y) space. Given
that we have also solved for the steady-state equilibrium values of r and ˙ Qt/Qt, the R&D
equation (9) can be graphed as an upward sloping line in (x, y) space. Both equations are
illustrated in Figure 2 and keeping in mind that x and y are constant in steady state, the
unique intersection of these two equilibrium conditions at point A determines the steady-
state values of relative R&D di culty x and consumer demand y.
We can determine the rate of economic growth in this steady-state equilibrium by study-
ing how consumer utility changes along the equilibrium path. Substituting (2) into (1) and
using y   Qt   ct/P
1  
t to substitute for ct, we obtain






(2qLE + qLN) 
1   + qCF
   
  1 . (12)






Figure 2: The Steady-State Equilibrium.
growth rate gu   ˙ ut/ut = 1
  1 ˙ Qt/Qt, which after substituting for ˙ Qt/Qt yields
gu   ˙ ut/ut =
n
(    1)(1    )
. (13)
The utility growth rate is proportionate to the population growth rate n. Since static utility





t is a measure of the real wage at time t. Thus the real
wage growth rate is the same as the utility growth rate and gu also represents the rate of
economic growth in this model.
Equation (13) implies that public policy changes like trade liberalization (a decrease
in  ) have no e ect on the steady-state rate of economic growth. In this model, growth
is “semi-endogenous.” We view this as a virtue of the model because both total factor
productivity and per capita GDP growth rates have been remarkably stable over time in
spite of many public policy changes that one might think would be growth-promoting. For
21example, plotting data on per capita GDP (in logs) for the US from 1870 to 1995, Jones (2005,
Table 1) shows that a simple linear trend ﬁts the data extremely well. Further evidence for
equation (13) is provided by Venturini (2010). Looking at US manufacturing industry data
for the period 1973-1996, he ﬁnds that semi-endogenous growth models (where public policies
do not have long-run growth e ects) have better empirical support than fully-endogenous
growth models (where public policies have long-run growth e ects).
For the measures mLN and mLE to remain constant in steady-state equilibrium, the
outﬂow of ﬁrms from mLN must be equal to the inﬂow, that is, mLNIE = mLEI. Substituting




2   mLE
 
IE = mLEI, from which it follows that
mLE =
IE/2
I+IE and mLN =
I/2
I+IE. The last two equations show that an increase in IE leads to
an increase in the measure of products purchased from exporting leaders mLE and a decrease
in the measure of products purchased from non-exporting leaders mLN.
2.10 Firm Exit
When a ﬁrm innovates and becomes a new quality leader, one can say that the “birth” of a
new ﬁrm has occurred. This birth is also associated with “death”, as the previous quality
leader stops producing and in a sense dies. We deﬁne the ﬁrm exit rate or death rate nD as
the rate at which ﬁrms die in the Home country.
To calculate the ﬁrm exit rate, we need to ﬁrst specify how many ﬁrms produce a product
when it is produced by the competitive fringe. When it becomes common knowledge how
to produce a product variety, any ﬁrm can produce it. We solve for an equilibrium where
two ﬁrms actually do. Given that ﬁrms are price-setters, two ﬁrms is enough to generate
a perfectly competitive outcome with zero economic proﬁts (the Bertrand equilibrium), so
there is no incentive for other ﬁrms that know how to produce a product to enter and start
producing.3
3This is a model with an inﬁnite number of equilibria. In markets where ﬁrms in the competitive fringe
produce, the number of producing ﬁrms can be two, three or one billion. Given that the equilibrium price
equals marginal cost and producing ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts, competitive fringe ﬁrms are indi erent between
producing and not producing. However, all the equilibria look the same from the perspective of consumers
and thus we choose to focus on one particular equilibrium, the one where two ﬁrms from the competitive
fringe produce when a product is produced by the competitive fringe. If only one competitive fringe ﬁrm
produces a product, then this ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by charging a price greater than marginal cost.
Other ﬁrms then have an incentive to enter and charge a slightly lower price, so there is no equilibrium with
22The ﬁrm exit rate is then given by
nD  
ImLN + ImLE +( IE + I)2mCF
mLN + mLE +2 mCF
.
For the measure of product varieties mLN+mLE where there are Home quality leaders, Home
innovation occurs at the rate I and results in the death of these ﬁrms. For the measure of
product varieties mCF where there is a Foreign non-exporting leader and a Home competitive
fringe (consisting of two producers), both Foreign innovation (which occurs at rate I) and




I+IE and mLN =
I/2
I+IE = mCF, straightforward calculations yield the
steady-state ﬁrm exit rate
nD =
3I (I + IE)
3I + IE
.
Since  nD/ IE =6 I2/(3I + IE)
2 > 0, it follows that trade liberalization leads to a higher
rate at which ﬁrms die, since trade liberalization increases IE. We have established
Proposition 2 Trade liberalization leads to a higher ﬁrm exit rate (    =  nD  ).
Pavcnik (2002) studies a period of trade liberalization in Chile (1979-1986) and reports
that it coincided with a “massive” exit rate of ﬁrms. Gibson and Harris (1996) present evi-
dence of increasing ﬁrm exit as a result of trade liberalization in New Zealand. Gu, Sawchuk
and Rennison (2003) show a signiﬁcant increase in the exit rate of ﬁrms in 81 Canadian
manufacturing industries as a result of tari  cuts. Initially lower exit rates increased after
trade liberalization policies were introduced. This paper presents the ﬁrst model that is
consistent with this evidence. Haruyama and Zhao (2008) present another quality ladders
growth model with endogenous ﬁrm turnover but trade liberalization does not a ect the ﬁrm
exit rate in their setup. In Melitz (2003), an exogenous ﬁrm exit rate is assumed (since there
is no other reason why ﬁrms would choose to go out of business) and consequently trade
liberalization has no e ect on the exit rate of ﬁrms that have already entered a market.
just one ﬁrm from the competitive fringe producing.
232.11 Comparing Exporters and Non-Exporters
We now examine whether exporting ﬁrms charge higher prices than non-exporting ﬁrms.
The average price charged by exporting ﬁrms is PE  
mLE +mFE 
mLE+mFE =  . The average price
charged by non-exporting ﬁrms is PN  
mLN +2mCF1
mLN+2mCF and thus PE >P N always holds. We
have established
Proposition 3 Exporting ﬁrms charge higher prices on average than non-exporting ﬁrms.
A number of recent papers point out the correlation of export status with prices charged
by ﬁrms. Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) use data from Colombia to compare output prices
(what ﬁrms charge on their home markets) and export status of manufacturers. They ﬁnd
a positive relationship, that is, exporters charge higher prices. Hallak and Sivadasan (2009)
also ﬁnd a positive relationship using Indian and U.S. data. In our model, exporters charge
the price   and this is higher than the average price of non-exporters, which is a convex
combination of the price   charged by non-exporting leaders and the price one charged by
competitive fringe ﬁrms.
The Melitz (2003) model cannot account for the above-mentioned evidence regarding
the pricing behavior of exporters and non-exporters. In Melitz (2003), it is the ﬁrms that
charge the lowest prices that export. The ﬁrms that charge the lowest prices are the highest
productivity ﬁrms and the highest productivity ﬁrms are the ﬁrms that export.
Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) develop an alternative model to account for the evidence
about the pricing behavior of exporters. In their model, any ﬁrm that draws a higher
marginal cost can also produce a higher quality product. The competitiveness of ﬁrms
increases with higher marginal cost due to the lower quality-adjusted price that they charge.
Baldwin and Harrigan assume that q = a1+ , where q is the quality level of a product, a its
marginal cost and   is a parameter that is restricted to be positive. Given  > 0, quality
increases quickly enough so that the quality-adjusted price falls as marginal cost increases.
Exporters end up producing higher quality products and charging higher prices. In our
model by contrast, all ﬁrms have the same marginal cost of one and there is no connection
between marginal cost and the quality of products. Nevertheless, our model is consistent
with the evidence that exporters tend to charge higher prices.
24De Loecker and Warzynski (2011) study a panel of Slovenian ﬁrms for the period 1994-
2000 and ﬁnd that exporters charge signiﬁcantly higher markups (of price over marginal cost).
Their measure of markups for exporters is a share weighted average markup across markets,
where the weight by market is the share of an input’s expenditure used in production sold
in that market. Using that deﬁnition in the setup of our model, the markup of the average
exporting ﬁrm is µE    
1+ 
 
  + 1
1+ 
 
1, which simpliﬁes to µE = 2 
1+ . Non-exporting ﬁrms are
either non-exporting leaders or competitive fringe ﬁrms (with two producing in equilibrium).









mLN = mCF, this simpliﬁes to µN =  +2
3 . Thus our model is consistent with the evidence in
De Loecker and Warzynski (2011) and satisﬁes µE >µ N if 2 
1+  >  +2
3 . It is easy to show that
this is the case for all     (1,2) and with the focus in this paper on non-drastic innovations,
    (1,2) is easily satisﬁed.4 We can therefore write:
Proposition 4 Exporting ﬁrms charge higher markups on average than non-exporting ﬁrms.
We can also examine whether exporting ﬁrms are more productive than non-exporting
ﬁrms. For all ﬁrms, one unit of labor produces one unit of output but ﬁrms di er in the
quality of products they know how to produce. Thus, more productive ﬁrms in our model
are ﬁrms that know how to produce higher quality products. The average quality of products
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since mLN = mCF. It is straightforward to verify that exporting ﬁrms sell higher quality
products on average than non-exporting ﬁrms and hence have higher average productivity
when IE is su ciently low:
Proposition 5 Exporting ﬁrms are more productive on average than non-exporting ﬁrms
and QE >Q N holds if 3 >  and (3    )I > IE.
The condition 3 >  is easily satisﬁed for plausible parameter values. For example, if
  =1 .40,   =0 .6 and   =1 /(1    ) = 2.5, then 3 >       1 =1 .41.5   1.65. Equation
4The inequality 2 
1+  >  +2
3 can be rewritten as 5  >    +2   + 2. Since   <  , the inequality holds if
5 >  2 +2   + 2 or 0 > (    2)(    1). We conclude that µE >µ N holds for all     (1,2).
25(11) implies that (3    )I > IE is satisﬁed when AE is su ciently small because then IE is
su ciently small. The condition (3    )I > IE holds when the product innovation rate I
is signiﬁcantly higher that the rate at which ﬁrms learn to become exporters IE and most
ﬁrms are non-exporters in equilibrium. This is exactly what Bernard et. al. (2003) ﬁnd in
their study of 200,000 U.S. manufacturing plants, where only 21 percent reported exporting.
Thus, we view (3    )I > IE as being the main case of interest, and when this condition
holds, the model has the implication that exporting ﬁrms are more productive on average
than non-exporting ﬁrms.
In Melitz (2003), not only are exporting ﬁrms more productive on average than non-
exporting ﬁrms, all exporting ﬁrms are more productive than all non-exporting ﬁrms. There
is a threshold productivity value which separates exporters from non-exporters, with all
exporters having productivity above the threshold and all non-exporters having productiv-
ity below the threshold. In our model by contrast, there is no such threshold: there are
exporters that are less productive than certain non-exporters. Proposition 5 speaks about
productivity on average within the groups of exporters and non-exporters. In support of
this proposition, Bernard et. al. (2003) present empirical evidence that the exporter pro-
ductivity distribution is substantially shifted to the right (higher productivity) compared
to the non-exporter productivity distribution, but at the same time there is a signiﬁcant
overlap in these distributions, meaning that there does not exist a threshold productivity
value separating exporters from non-exporters.
3 Numerical Results
To learn more about the steady-state equilibrium properties of the model, we turn to com-
puter simulations. In this section, we report results obtained from solving the model numer-
ically.
In our computer simulations, we used the following benchmark parameter values:   =
0.04, n =0 .014,   =1 .3,   =1 .4,   =0 .6,   =0 .5,   =0 .53, L0 = 1, AF = 1 and
AE =0 .59. The subjective discount rate   was set at 0.04 to reﬂect a real interest rate
of 4 percent, consistent with evidence in McGrattan and Prescott (2005). The population
26growth rate n =0 .014 equals the annual rate of world population growth between 1991
and 2000 according to the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2003). Novy (2011)
estimates that the year 2000 tari  equivalent of US trade costs with Canada and Mexico
were 25 percent and 33 percent, respectively. The trade cost parameter   was set at 1.3 to
reﬂect 30 percent trade costs. The innovation size parameter choice   =1 .4 then implies
that the markup of price over marginal cost is 40 percent in the domestic market ( /1) and 8
percent in the export market ( / ), which is within the range of markup estimates reported
in Morrison (1990). The preference parameter   was set at 0.6 to guarantee that innovations






is satisﬁed. The parameter   =0 .5
describes the degree of decreasing returns to R&D in learning how to export and is within
the range of decreasing returns to R&D estimates reported in Kortum (1993). The R&D
spillover parameter   =0 .53 was chosen to generate a steady-state economic growth rate
of 2 percent using gu = n
(  1)(1  ), which is consistent with the average US GDP per capita
growth rate from 1950 to 1994 reported in Jones (2005). L0 = 1 represents a normalized
value for the initial population level at time t = 0 and AF = 1 represents a normalized value
for the R&D productivity parameter. Finally, AE =0 .59 was chosen to guarantee that 21
percent of ﬁrms export, consistent with the evidence in Bernard et. al. (2003). With these
benchmark parameter choices, the condition (3    )I > IE is satisﬁed and exporting ﬁrms
are more productive on average than non-exporting ﬁrms.
To solve the model, we ﬁrst solve (11) for the steady-state equilibrium value of IE. Then
we solve simultaneously the labor equation (8) and the R&D equation (9) for the steady-
state equilibrium values of x and y. The results obtained from solving the model numerically
are reported in Table 1.5 The top row of results shows the steady state equilibrium outcome
for the benchmark parameter values (including   =1 .3) and the remaining rows show how
the steady state equilibrium changes when the trade cost parameter   is decreased, that is,
when trade liberalization occurs. The last two columns show the fraction of ﬁrms that export
fE  
mLE
mLE+mLN+2mCF and the steady-state utility level u0 of the representative consumer at
time t = 0. The later is obtained by solving x   Q
1  
t /Lt for Qt, then substituting this
expression into (12) and evaluating at time t = 0. There are three main conclusions that we
5The MATLAB code used to solve the model can be obtained from the authors upon request.
27draw from studying Table 1.
  gu II E qLE qLN qCF x y nD fE u0
1.3 0.02 0.045 0.036 0.210 0.435 0.144 4.66 0.685 0.064 0.21 7.07
1.2 0.02 0.045 0.061 0.268 0.329 0.134 5.06 0.693 0.073 0.31 7.96
1.1 0.02 0.045 0.079 0.297 0.282 0.124 5.57 0.702 0.079 0.37 9.12
1.0 0.02 0.045 0.093 0.314 0.255 0.116 6.12 0.710 0.082 0.41 10.48
Table 1. The E ects of Trade Liberalization (    )
First, trade liberalization monotonically increases the steady-state rate at which ﬁrms
learn how to become exporters (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, IE increases from 0.036 to
0.093). This property was already established in Proposition 1 but it is interesting to see how
large quantitatively the e ect is. Due to the increased investment by ﬁrms in learning how to
export, there is a big increase in the steady-state fraction of ﬁrms that export (fE increases
from 0.21 to 0.41), a big increase in the death rate of ﬁrms because other ﬁrms are learning
how to export (nD increases from 0.064 to 0.082) and a big increase in the quality share of
Home exporters in the total quality index (qLE increases from 0.210 to 0.314). The intuition
behind these properties is quite straightforward: trade liberalization leads to higher proﬁts
from exporting and increases the incentives ﬁrms have to learn how to export. Firms respond
by devoting more resources to learning how to export and more ﬁrms end up exporting in
steady-state equilibrium.
Second, trade liberalization monotonically increases the steady-state level of relative R&D
di culty (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, x increases from 4.66 to 6.12). Since relative R&D
di culty x(t)   Q
1  
t /Lt only gradually adjusts over time and a new higher steady-state level
means that along the transition path Q
1  
t must grow at a higher rate than Lt = L0ent, trade
liberalization must lead to a temporary increase in the innovation rate. Trade liberalization
has no e ect on the steady-state innovation rate I = n/[(    1)(1    )] = 0.045 but the
increase in x means that it does lead to a signiﬁcant temporary increase in innovation by
ﬁrms.
28Third, trade liberalization monotonically increases steady-state consumer utility and ag-
gregate productivity (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, u0 increases from 7.07 to 10.48).
Thus, the model is consistent with the evidence reported in Pavcnik (2002), Treﬂer (2004)
and Bernard and Jensen (2004b) that trade liberalization leads to aggregate productivity
gains. Since the steady-state rate of economic growth gu   n
(  1)(1  ) =0 .02 is una ected
by trade liberalization, we conclude that trade liberalization makes consumers in both coun-
tries substantially better o  in the long run. The reason why the welfare gains from trade
liberalization are so large (a 48 percent increase in u0) is that trade liberalization beneﬁts
consumers through two channels: consumers beneﬁt from the substantial increase in export-
ing by foreign ﬁrms (they are eventually buying a much higher share of imported products
and these products are of higher quality than what the local competitive fringe can pro-
duce) and consumers beneﬁt from the substantial increase in innovation by ﬁrms (they are
eventually buying much higher quality versions of domestically produced varieties).
To properly appreciate the results in Table 1, it is helpful to consider what the e ects
of trade liberalization are in a closely comparable model with Melitz-type assumptions:
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010). This paper presents a semi-endogenous growth model
with two symmetric countries and the same equation gu = n
(  1)(1  ) determines the steady-
state rate of economic growth (given that     1/(1  )). So by choosing the same benchmark
parameter values for n,   and  , we obtain the same steady-state rate of economic growth
in both models. In Melitz (2003), the steady-state rate of economic growth is zero. The
Gustafsson-Segerstrom model has a positive steady-state rate of economic growth and is
arguably the model with this property that is most similar to Melitz (2003).
In our computer simulations with the Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) model, we used
the following benchmark parameter values:   =0 .04, n =0 .014,   =1 .3,   =0 .6,   =0 .53,
L0 = 1,   =0 .75, ¯ a = 1, k = 3, FI = 1, FL = 1 and FE =1 .472. The ﬁrst 6 benchmark
parameter values are the same as above and imply a 4 percent real interest rate, a 1.4 percent
population growth rate, 30 percent trade costs and a 2 percent economic growth rate. In
Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010), the parameter   measures the international dimension
of knowledge spillovers in R&D (not innovation size).   = 0 corresponds to no international
spillovers and   = 1 corresponds to perfect international spillovers. By choosing   =0 .75,
29we capture that international knowledge spillovers in R&D are considerable but not perfect.
¯ a and k represent the shape and scale parameters of the Pareto distribution that ﬁrms draw
their marginal cost levels from. ¯ a = 1 represents a normalized value for the shape parameter
(all the marginal cost levels that ﬁrms can draw are less than one) and the scale parameter
k = 3 was chosen to guarantee that the expected discounted proﬁts of ﬁrms are ﬁnite [the
condition     k/(    1) > 1 is satisﬁed, where     1/(1    ) > 1]. The parameter FI
determines the units of knowledge that need to be created to develop a new product variety,
FL determines the units of knowledge needed to sell a new variety in the local market, and
FE determines the units of knowledge needed to sell a new variety in the foreign market.
FI = 1 and FL = 1 represent normalized values for the ﬁrst two parameters and FE =1 .472
was set to guarantee that 21 percent of ﬁrms export their products, consistent with the
evidence in Bernard et. al. (2003).
The results obtained from solving the Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010) model numer-
ically are reported in Table 2. The top row of results shows the steady state equilibrium
outcome for the benchmark parameter values (including   =1 .3) and the remaining rows
show how the steady state equilibrium changes when the trade cost parameter   is decreased.
There are three conclusions that we draw from studying Table 2.
  gu aL aE z ¯ Ff E u0
1.3 0.02 0.914 0.543 4.53 2.62 0.21 13.1
1.2 0.02 0.895 0.577 4.26 2.79 0.27 12.7
1.1 0.02 0.872 0.612 3.92 3.02 0.35 12.3
1.0 0.02 0.841 0.650 3.53 3.36 0.46 11.8
Table 2. Trade Liberalization in Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010)
First, trade liberalization monotonically increases the marginal cost cuto  value aE for
entering the export market and monotonically decreases the marginal cost cuto  value aL for
entering the local market (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, aE increases from 0.543 to 0.650
and aL decreases from 0.914 to 0.841). Thus, after having drawn marginal cost levels a from
a Pareto distribution G, a wider range of ﬁrms ﬁnd that they are productive enough to enter
30the export market (a   aE) and a narrower range of ﬁrms ﬁnd that they are productive
enough to enter the local market (a   aL). These are standard properties that hold in
many models with Melitz-type assumptions. Lower trade costs increase the proﬁts earned
from exporting, inducing more ﬁrms to become exporters and increase the competition that
ﬁrms face operating in their local markets. Consequently, trade liberalization increases the
steady-state equilibrium fraction of ﬁrms fE   G(aE)/G(aL) = (aE/aL)k that export their
products (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, fE increases from 0.21 to 0.46), as was the case
earlier with our Table 1 results.
Second, trade liberalization monotonically decreases the steady-state level of relative
R&D di culty (when   decrease from 1.3 to 1.0, z decreases from 4.53 to 3.53). In this
model, relative R&D di culty is deﬁned by zt   m
1  
t /Lt, where mt is the number of
varieties produced per economy at time t. Since relative R&D di culty zt only gradually
adjusts over time and a new lower steady-state level z means that along the transition
path m
1  
t must grow at a lower rate than Lt = L0ent, trade liberalization must lead to a
temporary decrease in the innovation rate g   ˙ mt/mt. Trade liberalization has no e ect
on the steady-state innovation rate g = n/(1    ) but the decrease in z means that it does
lead to a signiﬁcant temporary decrease in innovation by ﬁrms. This result stands in sharp
contrast with the earlier result in Table 1, where trade liberalization lead to signiﬁcantly
more innovation by ﬁrms.
Third, trade liberalization monotonically decreases steady-state consumer utility and
aggregate productivity (when   decrease from 1.3 to 1.0, u0 decreases from 13.1 to 11.8).
Since the steady-state rate of economic growth gu   n
(  1)(1  ) =0 .02 is una ected by
trade liberalization, we conclude that trade liberalization makes consumers in both countries
substantially worse o  in the long run. This is the big surprise that emerges from solving
the Gustafsson-Segerstrom (2010) model numerically.
How can trade liberalization make consumers in general worse o ? To understand what
is going on, it is helpful to focus on the Melitz-type assumptions that are driving this result.
When trade liberalization occurs (  decreases), more ﬁrms become exporters (the threshold
marginal cost aE increases) but the increase in ﬁrm competition also means that fewer ﬁrms
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter their domestic market (the threshold marginal cost aL decreases).
31Firms need a more favorable marginal cost draw to justify domestic production (as is stan-
dard in models with Melitz-type assumptions). Put another way, ﬁrms need to incur the
costs of more draws on average from the Pareto distribution G to develop a proﬁtable new
variety. The ex ante expected ﬁxed cost of developing a proﬁtable new variety (measured in
units of knowledge created) is
¯ F   FI
1
G(aL)
+ FL + FE
G(aE)
G(aL)
and as Table 2 shows, this increases in response to trade liberalization (when   decrease
from 1.3 to 1.0, ¯ F increases from 2.62 to 3.36). Firms respond to this higher expected
cost by cutting back on R&D investment and consequently trade liberalization leads to less
innovation (z decreases). If this innovation e ect is large enough to o set the consumer
beneﬁts that come from more ﬁrms exporting, consumers in general can be made worse o 
by trade liberalization, as we ﬁnd in Table 2.
In Gustafsson and Segerstrom (2010, p.225), it was argued that the empirically most
relevant case is where  < 0. Having now solved the model numerically, we realize that this
earlier conclusion was wrong. To get a realistic rate of economic growth, the R&D spillover
parameter   needs to be positive and su ciently large. The properties of the Gustafsson-
Segerstrom model for di erent values of   are illustrated in Table 3.
 gu  u0  u0
0.53 0.020 1.3 13.1 1.0 11.8
0.38 0.015 1.38 .86 1.08 .69
0.07 0.010 1.35 .43 1.05 .83
 0.88 0.005 1.32 .97 1.03 .49
Table 3. Trade Liberalization with Di erent Rates of Economic Growth
The top row of results reproduces information in Table 2 (given   =0 .53 and other bench-
mark parameter values, when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, u0 decreases from 13.1 to 11.8).
The remaining rows shows what happens if   is lower and the steady-state rate of economic
32growth gu is lower (1.5 percent, 1.0 percent or 0.5 percent). If   =0 .38, trade liberalization
still makes consumers worse o  (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, u0 decreases from 8.86
to 8.69). But trade liberalization makes consumers slightly better o  if   =0 .07 (when  
decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, u0 increases from 5.43 to 5.83) and trade liberalization makes con-
sumers signiﬁcantly better o  if   =  0.88 (when   decreases from 1.3 to 1.0, u0 increases
from 2.97 to 3.49). We conclude that trade liberalization can make consumers better o  in
the Gustafsson-Segerstrom model but only when the steady-state rate of economic growth is
unreasonably low (0.5 percent or 1.0 percent). For plausible parameter values and reasonable
rates of economic growth (around 2 percent), trade liberalization makes consumers worse o 
in this model with Melitz-type assumptions.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a standard quality ladders endogenous growth model with one
signiﬁcant new assumption, that it takes time for ﬁrms to learn how to export. We show
that this model without Melitz-type assumptions can account for all the evidence that the
Melitz (2003) model was designed to explain plus much evidence that the Melitz model
cannot account for. In particular, consistent with the empirical evidence, we ﬁnd that trade
liberalization leads to a higher exit rate of ﬁrms, that exporters charge higher prices and
markups for their products, and that many large ﬁrms do not export.
Another reason for avoiding Melitz-type assumptions emerges when we solve the model
numerically. We ﬁnd that the long-run welfare gains from trade liberalization are much
larger in our quality ladders model than in a closely comparable model with Melitz-type as-
sumptions. In our quality ladders model, trade liberalization beneﬁts consumers through two
channels: consumers beneﬁt from the increase in exporting by foreign ﬁrms and consumers
beneﬁt from the global increase in innovation by ﬁrms (Table 1). In the closely comparable
model with Melitz-type assumptions, trade liberalization beneﬁts consumers through the
ﬁrst channel but leads to a global decrease in innovation by ﬁrms. For plausible parameter
values and reasonable rates of economic growth, we ﬁnd that this second channel dominates,
implying that trade liberalization makes consumers worse o  in the long run (Table 2).
33To keep our analysis as simple as possible, we have made some strong assumptions in
this paper. We have assumed that all innovations are non-drastic, so no ﬁrm can get away
with charging a pure monopoly price without losing consumers to rival ﬁrms. We have
also focused on the case where exporting ﬁrms do not try to improve their own products,
by making appropriate restrictions on the possible values of model parameters. Exploring
how the model’s properties change when these simplifying assumptions are relaxed is an
important topic for further research.
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Consumers
The representative household’s optimization problem can be solved in three steps.
The ﬁrst step is to solve the within-variety static optimization problem. Focusing on a
particular variety  , since products of di erent quality are perfect substitutes by assumption
(equation 1), consumers only buy the product(s) with the lowest quality-adjusted price
p(j, ,t)/ j. The easiest way to see this is to solve the simple consumer optimization problem
maxd1,d2 d1 +  d2 subject to p1d1 + p2d2 = c, d1   0 and d2   0. The solution is to only buy
good 1 if p1 <p 2/  and only buy good 2 if p1 >p 2/ .









d  subject to ct =
  1
0
p( ,t)d( ,t)d ,
where j( ,t) is the quality level with the lowest quality adjusted price p(j, ,t)/ j of product
variety   at time t, or alternatively, the number of innovations in variety   from time 0 to












= p( ,t)d( ,t),z (0,t)=0 ,z (1,t)=ct,
where z( ,t) is a new state variable. The Hamiltonian function for this optimal control
problem is H  
 
 j( ,t)d( ,t)
   + µ( ,t)p( ,t)d( ,t), where µ( ,t) is the costate variable.
The costate equation  H/ z = 0 =   µ/   implies that µ( ,t) is constant across  . Taking
this into account, the ﬁrst-order condition  H/ d =   j( ,t) d( ,t)  1 + µ(t)p( ,t) = 0
implies that d( ,t)=
 
 µ(t)p( ,t)
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Now     1
1   implies that 1     = 1   1
1   =  
  1. Also q( ,t)    j( ,t) =  j( ,t)(  1) =
 
j( ,t)  
1  . Thus
d( ,t)=
q( ,t)p( ,t)  ct   1
0 q( ,t)p( ,t)1  d 




0 q( ,t)p( ,t)1  d , we can write the
demand function more simply as
d( ,t)=





The third step is to solve for the path of consumer expenditure that maximizes discounted
utility subject to the relevant intertemporal budget constraint. Static utility satisﬁes
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given that     =    
1   =1   , so lnut = lnct   lnPt and U  
   
0 e (  n)t ln[ut]dt =    
0 e (  n)t lnct dt  
   
0 e (  n)t lnPt dt. Each household chooses the time path of consumer
expenditure ct taking the time paths of q( ,t), p( ,t) and Pt as given, so the second integral
with lnPt can be ignored when maximizing discounted utility. The household’s intertempo-
39ral optimization problem simpliﬁes to maxc
   
0 e (  n)t lnctdt subject to the intertemporal
budget constraint ˙ at = w +( rt   n)at   ct, where at is the representative consumer’s asset
holding and w is the wage rate. The Hamiltonian function for this optimal control problem is
H   e (  n)t lnct+µt(wt+(rt n)at ct) where µt is the relevant costate variable. Maximizing
the Hamiltonian with respect to the control yields  H/ ct = e (  n)tc
 1
t  µt = 0, from where
we obtain µt = e (  n)tc
 1
t . Taking logs and di erentiating then yields ˙ µt/µt = n    ˙ ct/ct.
From the costate equation  H/ at = µt(rt n)= ˙ µt, we obtain ˙ µt/µt = n rt. Combining
the last two results gives the standard Euler equation ˙ ct/ct = rt    .
Product Markets
Letting p denote the price that the ﬁrm charges, the proﬁt ﬂow earned by a leader that sells
locally is  L( ,t) = (p 1)d( ,t)Lt =( p 1)
q( ,t)p  ct
P1  
t





 L with respect to p yields the ﬁrst order condition
  L( ,t)
 p
= [(1    )p
   +  p













from which it follows that the monopoly price is p =  
  1 = 1
1  /  
1   = 1
 . But we have
assumed that  < 1
 , so the leader ﬁnds it optimal to charge the limit price p =   instead. If
the leader charged the monopoly price, it would lose all consumers to the local competitive
fringe. Thus  L( ,t)=(   1)
q( ,t)   ct
P1  
t
Lt =(   1)
q( ,t)
Qt
Qt   ct
P1  
t
Lt and letting y(t)  









The proﬁt ﬂow that a leader earns from exporting is  E( ,t) = (p    )d( ,t)Lt =( p  
 )
q( ,t)p  ct
P1  
t




, where p now denotes the price charged to consumers
in the export market. Maximizing  E with respect to p yields the ﬁrst order condition
  E( ,t)
 p
= [(1    )p
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from which it follows that the monopoly price is p =   
  1 =  
 . But  < 1
  <  
  for all  > 1,
so the leader also ﬁnds it optimal to charge the limit price p =   in the export market. Thus
 E( ,t)=(      )
q( ,t)   ct
P1  
t
Lt =(      )
q( ,t)
Qt
Qt   ct
P1  
t
Lt and given y(t)  









The condition for exporting leaders to not improve their own products is
 L(j + 1) > L(j + 1) +  E(j + 1)    L(j)    E(j)
0 > E(j + 1)    L(j)    E(j)
0 > (     )
q(j + 1)
Qt
y(t)Lt   (    1)
q(j)
Qt







[(     )q(j + 1)   (    1)q(j)   (     )q(j)]
0 > (     ) 
j+1   (    1) 
j   (     ) 
j
0 > (     )    (    1)   (     ).
Knowing that  > 1, it is clear that increasing   decreases the right-hand-side (RHS) of
the last expression and makes it easier to satisfy the inequality. We want this inequality
to hold in the most restrictive case where free trade holds, namely   = 1. After dividing
0 > (    1)    (    1)   (    1) by (    1), we obtain 0 >    2 or      
 
1   < 2. Thus
 < 2
1  
  guarantees that exporting leaders do not have an incentive to improve their own
products for all     1.
Bellman Equations and Value Functions
The Bellman equation for follower ﬁrm i is
rvF(j) = max
li
 li + IivLN(j + 1) = max
li




 j( ,t)vLN(j + 1).




 j( ,t)vLN(j + 1) = 0 and solving










The Bellman equation for a non-exporting leader is given by
rvLN(j) = max
lE
 L(j)   lE   IvLN(j)+IE (vLE(j)   vLN(j)) + ˙ vLN(j). (4)
The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution is  1+ IE/ lE [vLE(j)   vLN(j)] = 0 and
















[vLE(j)   vLN(j)] = 0.
We can solve the ﬁrst-order condition for vLE(j). Noting that I
1/ 
E  j( ,t)/(Q
 
t AE)=lE and
41letting     (1    )/  > 0, we obtain
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Finding the Labor Equation
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Finding the R&D Equation
To ﬁnd the R&D equation, we use the Bellman equation for a non-exporting leader: rvLN(j)=
 L(j)   lE   IvLN(j)+IE (vLE(j)   vLN(j)) + ˙ vLN(j). Using ﬁrm proﬁts and substituting




t AElE/ j ,t
  
yields
rvLN(j) = (    1) 
j( ,t)y(t)
Qt







 IvLN(j)+IE (vLE(j)   vLN(j)) + ˙ vLN(j).
Now vLN(j)= j( ,t)/(Q
 
t  AF) implies that ˙ vLN(j)/vLN(j)=   ˙ Qt/Qt during an R&D race
and (5) implies that vLE(j)   vLN(j)= j( ,t)I 
E/(Q
 
t  AE). Thus, dividing the Bellman
equation by vLN(j) and rearranging terms yields
r + I +  
˙ Qt
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Finally, after substituting for vLN(j) and simplifying
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we obtain the R&D equation
r + I +  
˙ Qt
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E  . (9)
Quality Dynamics
The dynamics of QLE  
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43The dynamics of QLN  
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Using (10) again, we obtain that ˙ QLN/QLN =(    1)I  IE + (qLE/qLN)I = n/(1  ) and








It immediately follows that
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44and rearranging terms using the new variable z   qLN/qLE yields
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Multiplying both sides of the last equation by z then yields a quadratic equation in z
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Expanding the expression under the square root, we obtain
 
IE(    1)  
n
1    
 
 2
+4 IE (    1)
n
1    
 




1    
 
 2
+2 IE (    1)
n




IE(    1) +
n




It follows that the two solutions to the quadratic equation are
z1,2 =
 
 IE(    1) + n
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(1    )IE (    1)
.
Plugging this solution back into ˙ QLE/QLE =( qLN/qLE)IE  I = n/(1  ), we can uniquely
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=
n 
(1    )IE (    1)
IE  
n
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n
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=
n
(1    )(    1)
.
Plugging this result back into our solution for z, we obtain
qLN = qLE
n 





Using (10) one more time, we obtain that ˙ QCF/QCF =( qLE/qCF)I  IE = n/(1  ) and
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I(    1) + IE
.
It remains to determine the quality share qLE. Substituting into (7) and rearranging
46terms, we obtain
1 = 2qLE + qLN + qCF


























The Bellman equation for an exporting leader is rvLE(j)= L(j)+ E(j) IvLE(j)+ ˙ vLE(j).
Substituting into this Bellman equation for  L(j) and  E(j) yields
rvLE(j)=(     1)
 j( ,t)
Qt
yLt +(      )
 j( ,t)
Qt
yLt   IvLE(j) + ˙ vLE(j).
Next, we divide both sides of this equation by vLE(j) and substitute for vLE(j) using (5).
Taking into account that ˙ vLE/vLE =    ˙ Qt/Qt follows from (5) in any steady-state equilib-
rium where IE is constant over time, we obtain
r =








2    1    
I 
E/( AE)+1 / AF
Q
 
t  j( ,t)
Qt j( ,t) yLt   I     ˙ Qt/Qt
r + I +   ˙ Qt/Qt =
2    1    
I 






r + I +   ˙ Qt/Qt =
2    1    
I 




Solving the above expression for y/x and then substituting into the R&D equation (9), we
obtain
r + I +   ˙ Qt/Qt =(     1) AF
 





 AE + 1
 AF
 








Then dividing both sides of this equation by
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r + I +   ˙ Qt/Qt
 . (11)
47The Steady-State Equilibrium
























1   + qLN 
1   + qCF)Qt
  /(  1) ,
from which it follows that






(2qLE + qLN) 
1   + qCF
   
  1 . (12)
Taking logs of both sides and then di erentiating with respect to t yields the steady-state











(    1)(1    )
.
Firm Exit
Solving for the ﬁrm exit rate or death rate ND yields
ND  
ImLN + ImLE +( IE + I)2mCF


























(3I + IE)3I   3I(I + IE)




Comparing Exporters and Non-Exporters
Under what conditions is the average quality of products produced by exporters higher than
the average quality of products produced by non-exporters, or QE >Q N? Exploring when































I(    1) + IE
3 >  +
2IE
I(    1) + IE
.
Assuming that 3 > , QE >Q N holds when
(3    )I(    1) + (3    )IE > 2IE
(3    )I(    1) > (    1)IE
(3    )I > IE.
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